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Abstract 
Accountability and transparency are essential to the proper functioning of democracy in 
New Zealand. The Attorney-General is critical to constitutional arrangements by which he 
upholds both legal and political functions. This paper serves to describe, analyse and 
critique each of the Attorney-General’s specific roles and assess their relative frameworks 
for accountability using Bovens framework. As the Law Officer of government, named 
representative in Crown proceedings and the link between the Executive and the Judiciary, 
the Attorney-General permeates all three branches of government. Ultimately, this paper 
aims to expose the lack of forums available that can question the Attorney-General’s 
decisions and initiate consequences. It serves to diagnose, but not resolve, the 
accountability flaws. Some options for greater transparency and review are suggested, 
which derive from a comparative analysis with the United Kingdom. Finally, this paper 
looks at options outside formal accountability that assist with keeping the Attorney-
General in check. Conventions, a sense of duty and the need for a lawyer to occupy the 
position contribute to the overall control of the role. 
Key words: 
Attorney-General, Accountability, Conventions 
Word length: 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises 12,616 words. 
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I Introduction 
 
New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements are unwritten, flexible and, in some respects, 
ambiguous. The Attorney-General stands out amongst the top office holders as having 
extensive and important influence. Office-holders “are responsible for making decisions or 
providing authoritative advice, and thereby contributing significantly to the interpretation 
of New Zealand’s constitution.”1 Due to its constitutional significance, it is important to 
fully understand their appointment and dismissal procedures and the appropriateness of 
their accountability frameworks.2 This paper provides guidance on these questions through 
the analysis of the Attorney-General’s accountability. A useful accountability lens to adopt 
is the framework set out by Mark Bovens. Throughout this paper, accountability will adopt 
the meaning that it is “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has 
an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and 
pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.”3 In some parts of this paper the 
Attorney-General will therefore be referred to as ‘the actor’.   
 
Currently, there is no definitive answer to the transparency and accountability role of the 
Attorney-General. The Cabinet Manual 2008 provides some guidance on the role but in 
itself it is simply an authoritative account of conventions; it is not a legal document. 
Essentially, it states that the Attorney-General is the principal legal adviser, a Minister and 
almost always a member of Cabinet thereby providing legal advice in the course of 
government decision-making.4 
 
Unlike other Ministers, the Attorney-General has an overriding responsibility to act in the 
public interest.5 The actor has an obligation “to act on some matters independently, free of 
political considerations, with…the political partisanship that is otherwise properly 
associated with other ministerial offices.”6 This has provided inspiration for this paper - 
who is ensuring a political figure is using an apolitical mind? 
 
  
1 Matthew Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution and who interprets it? Constitutional realism and the 
importance of public office-holders?” (2006) 17 Public Law Review 133 at 153. 
2 At 153. 
3 Mark Bovens “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” 13 European Law 
Journal 447 at 450. 
4 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at [4.2]. 
5 L J King “The Attorney-General, Politics and the Judiciary” (Fourth Annual Colloquium of the Judicial 
Conference of Australia, University of Sydney, November 1999). 
6 King, above n 5. 
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The main responsibilities of the Attorney-General are discussed, followed by their relative 
accountability. First, the Attorney-General is a law officer. In this capacity, he or she 
provides legal advice, advises the Governor-General on the Royal assent and has a duty to 
report on any bills that are inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The 
lack of legal accountability surrounding the section 7 role was highlighted in the case of 
Boscawen v Attorney-General which held that the function was not judicially reviewable. 
Therefore, the Courts do not provide a forum to hold the Attorney-General to account. 
Alternatively, the report is discussed in Parliament and published online. Secondly, the 
Attorney-General is the named representative in Crown proceedings. By convention, 
however, prosecutions are delegated to the Solicitor-General in order to prevent any 
political interference in the Court processes. Conventions, the media and Parliamentary 
debate contribute to the control of this role, though they do not necessarily meet the 
threshold of accountability. Finally, the Attorney-General protects the judiciary from 
criticism in the House of Representatives and is responsible for appointing judges. The 
actor is described as the bridge and gatekeeper between the Executive, Parliament and 
Judiciary.7 In order for the Attorney-General to continue in this role, a medium for 
questioning his or her judicial appointments is crucial to open government. Many 
individuals and groups have argued in favour of a Judicial Appointments Commission as a 
result of being unsatisfied with this current position. 
 
Accountability aside, the Attorney-General is not free to do as he or she pleases. Preventing 
an Attorney-General from misusing his or her powers can be controlled through other 
means that are outside formal accountability. For example, their own sense of duty, 
expectations and skills instilled by a legal education or abiding by conventions and culture. 
It is therefore imperative that the selection process is robust and transparent to ensure that 
an appropriate candidate is chosen.  
 
In summary, the role of the Attorney-General entails being the protector of the rule of law. 
It is therefore imperative that the individual appointed to this role is answerable and 
responsible for his or her choices. Whilst a water-tight, wonder solution is not provided in 
the length of this paper, it serves to identify the flaws in the current accountability 
mechanisms; a diagnosis of the problem as such.  
 
 
  
7 Ben Heraghty “Defender of the Faith? The Role of the Attorney-General in Defending the High Court” 
(2002) 28 Monash University LR 206 at 208. 
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II The History of the Attorney-General 
 
The history of the Attorney-General is important because it shows the dramatic evolution 
of the role from an apolitical to political nature, and independence of Cabinet to being a 
Cabinet minister. Its origins are founded in the United Kingdom, where the Attorney-
General’s Office stemmed from the thirteenth-century. The King was unable to personally 
present in the Courts for pleadings and so subsequently, appointed an Attorney to carry out 
that role.8 The Attorney was “the only legal representative of the Crown recognised in this 
Court”.9 Under the reign of King Edward IV (1461-1483), an Attorney-General of England 
was appointed with the title of the senior law officer.10 To assist the Attorney-General and 
to act as Deputy, the first “King’s Solicitor” was appointed the same year, establishing the 
foundation to the modern office of the Solicitor-General.11 The defining features of the law 
officers in the United Kingdom were described as “the legal advisers of the Crown, the 
Ministry, and the departments of government; they are members of the Ministry, though 
never of the Cabinet and come and go with the change of party majorities”.12 This was 
inherited in New Zealand with the other English laws through the English Laws Act 1858.13 
 
In 1866, New Zealand legislation made the Attorney-General ineligible for membership of 
either House in the General Assembly or of the Executive Council. Like the United 
Kingdom, the Law Officer’s role at the time was non-political. Meanwhile, the Solicitor-
General of 1867 was a member of the Legislative Council. During this time, “it can be said 
that New Zealand had a political Solicitor-General and a politically independent Attorney-
General.”14 However, the arrangements were only temporary. The next Solicitor-General 
to be appointed was an independent law officer. This appointment was linked with the 
change in the Attorney-General’s Act of 1876 which “permitted, but did not require, the 
Attorney-General to be a member of the Executive Council or a member of either House 
of the General Assembly.”15 It was thought that even if a political Attorney-General would 
venture to imperil his reputation as a professional, by giving a biased and misleading 
opinion for political purposes, there would always be an officer as backup who would be 
  
8 King, above n 5. 
9 The King v Austen 9 Price 142, 147 ER 48 (Exch). 
10 King, above n 5. 
11 Wilkes v The King (1768) Wilm 322, 97 ER 123 (HL). 
12 William Anson The law and custom of the Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1907) at 207-208. 
13 English Laws Act 1858. 
14 John McGrath “Principles for Sharing Law Officer Power: the Role of the New Zealand Solicitor-General” 
(1998) 18 NZULR 197 at 200. 
15 At 200. 
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beyond the suspicion of party bias.16 This implies that the Solicitor-General is capable of 
being a safety net for any political suspicions on the Attorney-General’s behalf; an 
assumption that is doubted in part V(C) of this paper. 
 
III Accountability 
 
The personal accountability of an individual to Parliament for the way he conducts 
public office is an important principle of our constitutional law and to undervalue it 
would be a great mistake and likely to undermine the integrity of our system in the 
longer term. The Attorney-General must be accountable to Parliament if there is to be 
maximum trust or at least minimum skepticism.17 
 
Bovens provides a conceptual framework to analyse and assess public accountability. It is 
for this reason that I am using it as the standard for accountability in this paper. 
Accountability is important because it is essential to a well-functioning liberal democracy; 
it keeps the power of government checked and the public informed.18 There is increased 
demand by citizens to hold the government to account.19 The concept holds “strong 
promises of fair and equitable governance”.20 It is important that accountability be 
retrospective as opposed to ex ante control. 
In order to satisfy Bovens’ definition of accountability, three elements must be met. First, 
the actor should be obliged to inform the forum about his conduct. This is achieved “by 
providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes or about 
procedures.”21 It will also often involve providing explanations and justifications in the 
event of failure or accident. Secondly, there should be an opportunity for the forum to 
debate with the actor about his conduct; the actor must then have the opportunity to explain 
and justify his conduct in the course of the debate.22 The forum must be able to question 
the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct. Thirdly, both parties 
  
16 (1876) 23 NZPD 254 (Legislative Council). 
17 House of Commons The constitutional role of the Attorney General: fifth report of session 2006-07, report, 
together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence (Constitutional Affairs Committee, 17 July 2007) at 
36. 
18 Tom Willems “Public Accountability and PPP’s - How to obtain good public accountability in complex 
settings?” (PhD, University of Antwerp, 2000) at 2. 
19 Bovens, above n 3, at 449. 
20 At 449. 
21 At 451. 
22 At 451. 
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should know that the forum may pass judgement on the actor’s conduct.23 It may approve 
of the behaviour or in the case of a negative judgement, the forum may present the actor 
with certain consequences.24 Consequences may range from fines or evoking disciplinary 
measures to calling for a minister’s resignation or rendering account in front of television 
cameras.25 
 
Public accountability requires that institutions account for their conduct in “various forums 
in a variety of ways”.26 One important type of accountability is political accountability; 
voters delegate their sovereignty to popular representatives who then delegate to a cabinet 
of Ministers.27 The media are also increasing their capacity as informal forums for political 
accountability. Legal accountability is another type of accountability and is demonstrated 
in the courts. Here, legal scrutiny is based on legal standards.28 Alongside the Courts exists 
administrative accountability where the focus is on quasi-legal forums that exercise 
independent and external administrative and financial supervision and control.29 Another 
type of accountability is through professional responsibility where an individual must 
adhere to acceptable practices such as those set by the New Zealand Law Society for 
lawyers.30 Finally, social accountability depicts that actors should feel obliged to account 
for their performance to the public at large.31 This is facilitated through public reporting 
and establishing public panels. 
 
It is then important to assess the adequacy of accountability arrangements regimes to which 
an actor is subject.32 Bovens describes three different perspectives: a democratic, a 
constitutional and a learning perspective. A democratic perspective means that public 
accountability is held by citizens who control public office. Citizens sit at the end of the 
accountability chain and pass judgement on the conduct of the government and indicate 
their displeasure by voting for other popular representatives.33 Accountability supports 
democracy by providing the voters with “the information needed for judging the propriety 
  
23 Bovens, above n 3, at 451. 
24 At 451. 
25 At 452. 
26 At 454. 
27 At 455. 
28 At 456. 
29 At 456. 
30 At 456. 
31 At 457. 
32 At 462. 
33 At 463. 
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and effectiveness of the conduct of the government”.34 A phenomenon commonly referred 
to as the court of public opinion. Secondly, a constitutional perspective prevents “an 
overbearing, improper or corrupt government” through checks and balances of 
countervailing powers.35 This exists in New Zealand through the separation of powers 
doctrine. Lastly, accountability may be assessed through a learning perspective where 
accountability is “a tool to make and keep governments, agencies and individual officials 
effective in delivering on their promises.”36 The public nature of accountability “teaches 
others in similar positions what is expected of them, what works and what does not.”37 It 
forces them to reflect on the successes and failures of their past policy.38 
 
By contrast, transparency, in Bovens’ opinion, is not enough to constitute accountability.39 
Organisational transparency and freedom of information provides forums with the 
necessary information but it lacks an opportunity for questioning and judgement.40  
Transparency alone sees solely “to the element of publicness in public accountability, to 
the disclosure of information, the accessibility of the debates to the general public or the 
disclosure of the judgement”.41  Public reporting supports transparency but does not on its 
own qualify as public accountability. The public information must then be challenged: 
questions posed and judgement passed. A public debate about the reported information will 
arise “only if caught by the watchful eye of a journalist, an interest group or a lonely 
Internet activist, who in turn may stimulate a forum, such as a parliamentary standing 
committee, to hold the agency to account.”42   
 
In this paper the following potential accountability forums are discussed: the courts, 
Parliament, Crown Law, the media, the New Zealand Law Society and the public via 
elections. Irrespective of the forums, there is a degree of transparency in the role and it, at 
times, is quite high profile. The aim of this paper, however, is to prove that this is not 
enough. 
 
  
34 Bovens, above n 3, at 463. 
35 At 463. 
36 At 463. 
37 At 463. 
38 At 464. 
39 At 453. 
40 At 453. 
41 At 453. 
42 At 453. 
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IV Law Officer Role 
 Introduction 
As senior law officer, the Attorney-General has responsibility for the government’s 
administration of the law. There are three roles which I have categorised under the law 
officer capacity and each will be dealt with in turn. First, the Attorney-General provides 
legal advice to the government and encourages Cabinet ministers to seek legal advice. 
Secondly, the Attorney-General certifies that there are no reasons why Royal assent should 
be withheld. Thirdly, the Attorney-General protects and promotes the rule of law and in 
doing so, he or she reports on the consistency of bills with the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. 
 Legal Advice 
The Cabinet Manual requires that the law officer notifies Cabinet of any proposals or 
government action that does not comply with existing law. All legal advice that is provided 
to Ministers or government agencies (whether it is internal advice from departmental legal 
advisers, advice from the Crown Law Office, or advice from outside legal firms to either 
Ministers or government agencies) will attract solicitor/client privilege.43 If legal advice is 
protected by legal professional privilege, it may be protected from disclosure under the 
Official Information Act 1982 and the Privacy Act 1993, and will not be required to be 
produced for inspection during discovery in legal proceedings.44 The Attorney-General 
may waive legal privilege. 
 
Accountability is therefore heavily circumscribed by legal professional privilege. To 
enhance accountability and public confidence it is favourable that the government 
publishes all or most legal advice in political situations, but this is at the full discretion of 
the Attorney-General. Interest parties in government may apply to the Attorney-General to 
waive privilege. The legal advice must then be proven to be helpful to their discourse. 
Obviously, there are also clear circumstances where legal advice cannot be made public. 
For example, where proceedings are contemplated, it is not appropriate to release legal 
advice in relation to those circumstances. On the other hand, where the Government relies 
on legal advice to support a politically-focused argument, then publication of that advice 
is in favour to maintain public confidence in the role of the Attorney-General.45  
  
43 Cabinet Office, above n 4, at [4.61]. 
44 At [4.59]. 
45 House of Commons Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions Relating to the Attorney-General): 
Fourth Report of Session 2007-08 (Constitutional Affairs Committee, 24 June 2008) at 22. 
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Legal advice, protected by privilege, also limits the role’s transparent ambitions. Whilst it 
may be disclosed in some situations to government officials, the public at large are not able 
to request the advice under the Official Information Act pursuant to s 9(2)(h).46 There is 
that risk of an Attorney-General ‘hiding behind’ his privilege to avoid confrontation by 
different forums. Therefore, in order to best achieve transparency, it is necessary to divide 
the political issues from the legal functions of the Attorney-General. Making clear where 
the responsibility lies, albeit not always possible, might be in the interests of maintaining 
public confidence.47  
 
Whilst other Ministers are accountable to their electorate, the Attorney-General does not 
have that same accountability in terms of being answerable to a community. The Attorney-
General is appointed, on merit, by the Prime Minister.48 Arguably, therefore, the Attorney-
General under a Bovens analysis can be accountable to the Prime Minister, who can 
subsequently pose questions and make judgement on the Attorney-General’s decisions. 
However, this is limited by the fact that the Attorney-General is expected to be apolitical 
and not consult Cabinet in his law officer duties.  
 Royal Assent 
A bill does not become law until it has received royal assent. Granting of the royal assent 
signifies that it has been approved by the Head of State,49 and is given by the Governor-
General in New Zealand, who is the Sovereign’s representative. Constitutional convention 
ensures that the Governor-General signs the Bill only in accordance with the advice of the 
government. This advice is given in the form of an advice sheet signed by three prominent 
figures. The Clerk of the House signs to ensure there are no errors in the Bill, then the 
Attorney-General signs advising that there are no reasons why Royal assent should not be 
granted and, finally, the Prime Minister signs, advising that the Royal assent be granted.50 
This means that the Attorney-General has the final substantive comment on whether or not 
a Bill should be made into law.  
 
  
46 Section 9(2)(h) states “withholding of the information is necessary to maintain legal professional 
privilege”. 
47 House of Commons Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions Relating to the Attorney-General): 
Fourth Report of Session 2007-08, above n 45, at 14. 
48 Cabinet Office, above n 4, at [2.7]. 
49 “The Royal Assent” New Zealand Parliament <http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/features/00NZPHomeNews031220091/the-royal-assent>. 
50 “The Royal Assent”, above n 49. 
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Hypothetically, if the Attorney-General advised the Governor-General against signing the 
rights-infringing Bill, what would be the result? Is there an expectation that the Attorney-
General should speak up at the Royal assent stage if the Bill contains right-infringing 
provisions? The situation is almost impossible. The Attorney-General signs off on the bill 
after thorough checks have been completed by the Clerk’s Office and Parliamentary 
Counsel Office. There is no ability to challenge the Bill and advise the Governor-General 
not to sign because it is simply a pro forma signature; there is no substantive checking 
involved in Royal assent. Moreover, no bill presented to a Governor-General has ever been 
refused the Royal assent in New Zealand.51 In the United Kingdom, which has a 
comparable requirement for the Royal assent in the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons, Royal assent has not been refused since 1707.52 The constitutional principle 
that the Governor-General acts only on the advice of Ministers requires the Governor-
General to accept that advice except in the most extraordinary circumstances.53 
Circumstances that meet that extraordinary threshold have never arisen.  
 
Justice McGrath has made a number of commentaries about conventions relating to public 
officials. Specifically, he has said that “if Ministers take decisions outside the scope of 
convention, they will not on that account be restrained by the courts. They will, however, 
need to satisfy the electorate that the circumstances warranted the exercise of their power 
or suffer the political consequences.”54 This speaks to Bovens’ political dimension of 
accountability. Convention aside, there is no accountability mechanisms in place to cover 
a situation where the power to advise against assent is used. 
 Section 7 Report 
1 Introduction 
The section 7 reporting duty is very important in the law-making process. Legislative 
proposals are sometimes modified as a result of the section 7 process before they achieve 
their final form.55 An adverse report is beneficial in the legislative process because it 
conveys a clear message that the bill in question is consistent with rights and freedoms 
before it is introduced. This means that it is critical for the Attorney-General to be held to 
  
51 Kenneth John Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1962) at 85.  
52 Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Conventions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) at 22. 
53 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 7(a); “Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand” New Zealand Parliament 
<http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/about-parliament/how-parliament-
works/ppnz/00HOOOCPPNZ_271/chapter-27-the-legislative-process>.  
54 John McGrath “The Crown, the Parliament and the Government” 7 Waikato Law Review 1 at 6. 
55(10 October 1989) NZPD 13039. 
10  
 
account to ensure he or she performs the duty well. This section discusses the Court as an 
accountability forum, followed by the attention the section 7 report receives during debate 
in Parliament. A number of other institutions are suggested as an alternate section 7 report 
writer, with a standing committee proving to be the most effective. Ultimately, if the 
responsibility remains with the Attorney-General, the decision could be judicially 
reviewable. This will be addressed below. 
2 The section 7 requirements  
Specifically in the capacity as law officer, section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 requires 
the Attorney-General to “bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any 
provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights.”56 For all government Bills, that report must be made on 
the introduction of that Bill, prior to the first reading.57 In any other case, such as a private 
member’s bill, the report must be made as soon as is practicable after the introduction of 
the Bill.58 It was resolved in the parliamentary debate of the Bill of Rights bill that, prima 
facie, infringements did not require a report by the Attorney-General if the limitation was 
a reasonable one; it must be “justified in a free and democratic society” as per section 5.59  
 
The Attorney-General has no ongoing responsibility to report on a bill as it moves through 
the various stages of Parliamentary review.60  This means that amendments, whether it be 
at the select committee level or committee of the whole House stages, are not subject to a 
formal Attorney-General’s report.61 Whilst a wider interpretation of a continuous 
obligation might be preferred, section 7 is clear and unambiguous in its terms.62  
 
Ultimately, there is no remedy available if the Attorney-General does not certify the 
legislation, or if he certifies the legislation as complying with the Bill of Rights when it 
blatantly should not comply. If the Attorney-General does not make an effort to certify a 
bill and is therefore not strongly focused on his responsibility as a protector of rights, there 
are no reviews or sanctions in place by either Parliament, the courts or an independent body 
  
56 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
57 “Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand”, above n 53. 
58 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 7(b). 
59 Philip A Joseph “Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand” (4th ed, Brookers Ltd, 
Wellington, 2014) at 1279; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
60 “Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand” New Zealand Parliament, above n 53. 
61 R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 at [25], [66] and [96]. 
62 Claudia Geiringer “Declarations of inconsistency dodged again” (2009) NZLJ 232 at 233. 
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to rectify this.63 Devoid of any legal accountability, as will be discussed in the next section, 
the Courts mention there would some “constitutional crisis” on an inadequate performance 
by the Attorney-General.64 
3 The courts 
Legally, the Attorney-General has not yet been held to account by the courts. This was 
decided in Boscawen v Attorney-General where the plaintiffs sought a judicial review of 
section 7. The Boscawen case was brought in July 2007 when the Electoral Finance Bill 
was introduced for the purposes of regulating a number of aspects of election financing. 
This included political party and candidate donations, election expenses and the 
involvement of third parties.65 The plaintiffs argued that by placing limits on expenditure 
to promote electoral outcomes, the Bill restricted the right to freedom of expression as 
protected by section 14 of the Bill of Rights. Meanwhile, the Crown Law Office advised 
the then Attorney-General, Sir Michael Cullen, that despite the inconsistencies of the Bill 
against the right to freedom of expression, these inconsistencies were “demonstrably 
justified” under section 5.66 They were deemed to be reasonable and allowed for the 
legislation’s objectives of greater transparency, accountability and fairness in the 
democratic process.67 Subsequently, no section 7 report was issued to the House on the 
Electoral Finance Bill.  
 
The High Court and Court of Appeal both concluded that the Attorney-General’s duty to 
report was not judicially reviewable because it “imposed on him a parliamentary function 
and not one in his capacity as a member of the Executive”.68 It was deemed to be an intra-
parliamentary procedure which does not affect the rights of other persons.69 Intervention 
by judicial review into the legislative process “manifestly risks creating significant tensions 
between Parliament and the Courts”.70 The Justices in the Court of Appeal added that the 
Attorney-General did not exhibit any wilful refusal to comply with section 7 or to perform 
the function in bad faith. In effect, this means that there are two exceptions where the 
Attorney-General may be legally accountable for a refusal to issue a section 7 report, 
namely bad faith or wilful refusal, though the situation has not occurred to date. Parliament 
  
63 (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3762. 
64 Boscawen v Attorney-General [2009] 2 NZLR 299 (CA) at [41]. 
65 Electoral Finance Bill 2007 (130-3). 
66 Claudia Geiringer “Declarations of inconsistency dodged again”, above n 62, at 232. 
67 Electoral Finance Bill 2007 (130-3). 
68 Boscawen v Attorney-General [2008] NZAR 468 (HC) at [36]. 
69 At [41]. 
70 At [45]; also see Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General [2001] 1 NZLR 40. 
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is to be provided with the Attorney-General’s genuinely held view, despite whether others 
consider that view to be right or wrong.71 The Court points out that “it is hard to see how 
it could require the Attorney-General to make a report to Parliament which the Attorney-
General considered to be incorrect”.72 In conclusion, section 7 was not judicially 
reviewable as “it would effectively force a confrontation between the Attorney-General 
and the Courts.”73 The relevant Bovens’ perspective here is constitutional; the courts focus 
their interaction on the conformity of the Executive’s actions with the law. On the other 
hand, introducing judicial review may reflect an appropriate constitutional dialogue 
between the courts and Parliament, akin to a “chat over the fence”.74 
 
Despite ruling against the plaintiffs, there was an indication by the court that in some 
situations where the Attorney-General would cause atrocity, it may be appropriate for the 
Court to interfere;75 a small window of accountability was provided here. Counsel 
submitted a hypothetical possibility of an Attorney-General “who steadfastly refused to 
make a report to Parliament in the face of legislation clearly interfering with rights 
contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act despite advice to the contrary and in plain 
dereliction of duty.”76 The Court of Appeal sidestepped the question stating such a situation 
was not helpful to the analysis of the case. Nevertheless, they added “it would be likely 
that there would be a constitutional crisis of some magnitude and that may well be one of 
the less significant aspects of it.”77 It may be argued that Margaret Wilson’s refusal to 
accept Crown Law advice to make a section 7 report on the Foreshore and Seabed was, in 
the Court’s words, a “plain dereliction of duty”.78 Ultimately, the court of public opinion 
made judgement and crucified Wilson. Finlayson, current Attorney-General, concurred 
that there is a learning perspective gained from this situation. He stated “I do not see how 
an Attorney-General acting impartially as senior law officer could not have produced a 
section 7 report on those two bills [Electoral Finance Bill and Foreshore and Seabed Bill], 
both thankfully now repealed.”79 This learning perspective is not particularly strong 
because it is likely to be politically loaded. Wilson represented the Labour government 
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77 At [41]. 
78 At [40]. 
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while Finlayson is the Attorney-General for the National government. Regardless of 
political sway or not, looking to the past can provide some guidance for the future. 
 
Whilst the Attorney-General has not been held to account by the courts before, that does 
not rule out any future circumstances of court intervention in inappropriate behaviour. If a 
situation was presented to the Supreme Court where the appellants sought to overrule the 
decision in Boscawen, the Chief Justice may reconsider its stance and require that a more 
robust reporting mechanism be adopted by the Attorney-General. The Supreme Court could 
redefine the section 7 reporting duty so that it fell under his executive role, and therefore 
was judicially reviewable. I believe that the number of claims could be monitored by the 
judiciary to ensure that the Attorney-General is not consumed in Court time. Introducing 
judicial review would heighten the responsibility of the Attorney-General because the 
Courts would then become the forum to which the Attorney-General can be held to account. 
During the court process, specifically in cross-examination, he or she could be questioned 
about a refusal to report or justify the reasoning behind the process. This is a direct 
challenge to a failure to report. However, in terms of accountability, the examining process 
will always be limited because the section 7 report is subjective; each Attorney-General 
will provide differing views on consistencies with the Bill of Rights. The remedies 
available to the court are also not that well placed to provide consequences for a failed duty 
by the Attorney-General. The court may impose a fine or an order for that individual to be 
suspended from the position for a period of time. However, to impose the most serious 
consequence, namely calling for his resignation, that must stem from political pressure. 
This is discussed in the next part. 
4 Political accountability 
In essence, Parliament examines, criticises and debates. Parliament acts as an important 
intermediary between the government and the public, and can engage in accountability 
dialogue with the executive.80 It loosely meets Bovens’ definition of an accountability 
relationship, with extra discussion occurring in the select committee stage. There is 
Parliament’s question time, in which opposition and other backbench MPs can ask question 
of ministers and receive responses. 
 
In application of the Electoral Finance Act situation, opponents of the Act maintained, even 
after its enactment, that their freedom of expression was unjustifiably limited. 
Consequently, following its election to office in November 2008, the new government 
  
80 Auditor-General Third report for 1999: The accountability of Executive Government to Parliament (1999) 
at 16. 
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quickly repealed the Act. This was a favourable political result at the end of the day though, 
admittedly, only after an election had already been held under the offending regime.81 This 
gave effect to Bovens’ democratic perspective. This obvious dissatisfaction reflects poorly 
on the Attorney-General who had the opportunity to centralise this rights debate in the 
legislative process through issuing a section 7 report. 
 
When they are issued, section 7 reports are often criticised in Parliament. This means that 
the Attorney-General is often held to account in regard to his personal performance; 
Ministers of Parliament are in a position to interrogate the Attorney-General on the report. 
At the end of the day, however, the report is purely subjective and therefore it is the 
personal judgement of the Attorney-General that is being brought to criticism. A consistent 
poor performance in regard to section 7 reports may lead to a real lack of confidence in the 
law officer and, subsequently, his or her resignation being could be called for by the Prime 
Minister. Parliament has no involvement in the appointment process of the Attorney-
General and therefore has no removal powers like legislatures in some countries, for 
example the United States, have.  This is an obvious weakness from a constitutional 
perspective that Parliament does not have the power to remove a minister from office. 
Another weakness is that the focus of Parliamentary interaction can often be aimed at 
making political gain, rather than focusing on conformity of actions with laws and norms.  
 
Finally, the section 7 reports are published online on the Ministry of Justice website. This 
means that regular flagrant breaches have the potential to upset the public. Elections on 
their own are not an adequate accountability forum because they do not offer legal (or 
other) sanctions and provide no opportunity to criticise, but in saying that, they are a means 
to impose political consequences to vote in the opposition party.  
5 Options to improve accountability 
The weaknesses in political and legal accountability can amount to the idea that the duty 
would be better performed by another institution that is less subjective and less political. 
The three options that are discussed in the next part are the courts, a standing committee 
and a supreme Bill of Rights.  
 
By way of comparison to New Zealand, in the United Kingdom the sponsor minister makes 
the reports. In Canada, the Attorney-General is also the Minister of Justice so it is unlikely 
that he or she will ever make a report criticising compatibility with their equivalent Bill of 
Rights, as he or she cannot be seen to be part of a House that is party to an unconstitutional 
  
81 Claudia Geiringer “Declarations of inconsistency dodged again”, above n 62, at 232. 
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Bill.82 The “down-stream” consequences of section 7 reports are “less meaningful” in New 
Zealand than in the United Kingdom or Canada, who both assert a strong judicial review 
function.83 Section 7 reports, despite their frequency, form only a very minor part of the 
discussion in the House. This has the effect of having section 7 reports that are technically 
public but that are not widely put in the public eye.84 
 
First, there is the option that the judiciary address inconsistent legislation through 
declarations of inconsistency. In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, the 
judgment offered that the courts can and should inquire into the justifiability of legislative 
breaches of the Bill of Rights.85 The courts use their jurisdiction to make declarations of 
inconsistency as was requested in Boscawen. One academic reasoned that “formal 
declaratory relief would almost certainly make it more likely that the media would report 
a case as a victory against the Government, thus increasing the political pressure on the 
Government to respond to the breach.”86 In the case of Taylor v Attorney-General, the 
declaration of inconsistency received widespread media attention with a media release 
made by the Courts of New Zealand. Subsequent newspaper articles like “Prisoners should 
be allowed to vote: High Court” headlined the news.87 Additionally, Russell McVeagh 
noted that “whatever the response on a substantive level, it is hoped that Parliament 
publicly demonstrates serious engagement with the judgment.”88 The most significant 
weakness to the courts as a review of rights inconsistencies is that it is reactive (i.e. post-
legislation) rather than proactive (i.e. pre-legislation). 
 
Alternatively, if a supreme Bill of Rights was introduced, the judiciary could strike down 
legislation which is inconsistent with any rights and freedoms. Under a supreme law regime 
“the ability of political arms to directly challenge an unfavourable court decision is 
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difficult”.89 A supreme Bill of Rights would empower the judiciary and essentially place 
the court as assessors of section 7. In short, this would mean judges are now taking part in 
the legislative process, without having been legitimately and democratically elected. It is 
also noted that “if Parliament were required to await the Court’s decision, it would be a 
major impediment to the process”.90 This has its limitations as only cases that are litigated 
can be struck down. In terms of legal accountability, any bills containing inconsistencies 
with the Bill of Rights has the potential to be invalidated by the judiciary. This would create 
a very high standard of legal accountability, thereby making the section 7 report more 
critical to the parliamentary process than it is now, in order to ensure all inconsistencies 
are thoroughly addressed at an early stage.    
 
Finally, in the parliamentary debate of 1990 regarding the Bill of Rights Bill, it was argued 
that requiring the Attorney-General to report on every justifiable limit would swamp the 
House.91 However, it is feasible that the responsibility be reassigned to a Bill of Rights 
Standing Committee (to examine and report on all Bills), a recommendation that the House 
did not act upon.92 The House’s refusal to create such a committee was justified by 
claiming “the Standing Orders were sufficiently wide to allow select committees to 
undertake this role (should they wish) within their respective subject areas”. 93 Introducing 
a standing committee, in terms of accountability, would enhance the consultation process, 
add to critical discussions (like those held in select committees) and therefore be more 
objective and independent from politics. 
 
In conclusion, I believe that a permanent standing committee is an option to enhance the 
effect section 7 report has on the legislative process. However, in the current situation, 
where the Attorney-General remains as the author of a section 7 report, there needs to be 
more robust accountability mechanisms in place. This may be achieved by redefining the 
role and it becoming judicially reviewable, as is the case in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. 
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NZLR 299 (CA) at [35]. 
91 Joseph, above n 59, at 1279. 
92 At 1279. 
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V  Legal Proceedings Involving the Crown 
 Introduction 
There are two dimensions to legal proceedings involving the Crown. Firstly, under our 
current constitutional arrangements, the Attorney-General is responsible through 
Parliament to the citizens of New Zealand for prosecutions carried out by or on behalf of 
the Crown. The second dimension is that in practice, this role is delegated. The prosecution 
process is superintended by the Solicitor-General, who, pursuant to section 9A of the 
Constitution Act 1986, shares all the relevant powers vested in the office of the Attorney-
General.94 The rationale for this relationship is to remove any risks of political influence 
from legal proceedings. However, in cases of high public interest, the Attorney-General 
will become involved and assume proceedings. In these circumstances, there must be a 
degree of accountability. The following forums will be assessed in this part: the Solicitor-
General and Crown Law, the media and Parliament. 
 Defining the Role 
Provisions pertaining to the Attorney-General and legal proceedings have evolved slowly. 
In the Interpretation Act 1924, section 4 stated that the ‘Attorney-General’ is interpreted 
“in respect of any power, duty, authority, or function imposed upon or vested in him in 
virtue of his office as Attorney-General, includes the Solicitor-General”.95 The Finance Act 
1952 stated in section 27 that “functions of Attorney-General may be performed by 
Solicitor-General”.96 Finally, the Constitution Amendment Act 1999 inserted Section 9A 
into the Constitution Act 1986 stating that “the Solicitor-General may perform a function 
or duty imposed, or exercise a power conferred, on the Attorney-General.”97 Constitutional 
convention governs the non-political appointment of the Solicitor-General. Independence 
from government is essential to the proper exercise of those duties. The convention seeks 
to prevent the performance of criminal law being subject to any kind of political decision-
making.98  
 
Published guidelines titled Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines are important to 
“reinforce the expectation of the Law Officers and the Courts that a prosecutor will act in 
  
94 Solicitor General’s Prosecution Guidelines (Crown Law, July 2013) at 1. 
95 Interpretation Act 1924, s 4. 
96 Finance Act 1952, s 27. 
97 Constitution Amendment Act 1999, s 3. 
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a manner that is fundamentally fair, detached and objective.”99 Even though the Solicitor-
General is empowered to perform the Attorney-General’s role through the Constitution 
Act, this should not be interpreted as meaning the Solicitor-General is or can be the de facto 
Attorney-General. The Solicitor General only assists or supports the Attorney-General but 
that itself has “its working limitations since he or she also has no right of audience in 
Cabinet or Parliament”.100 The Solicitor-General must also willingly accept that his opinion 
as junior law officer can be overridden by the Attorney-General and his advice to 
government.101 It is the Attorney-General that has the final say. This reinforces the need 
for accountability. 
 
Occasionally, there are instances where the Attorney-General, rather than the Solicitor-
General, becomes directly involved in the decision-making process of individual 
cases.102 The circumstances are very rare; convention holds strong that the Attorney-
General does not interfere. However, it would be appropriate when the public interest in a 
prosecution is very high. For example, in regard to the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior 
in 1991, the accused was arrested in Switzerland.103 Due to the level of national and 
international interest, the then Attorney-General, Honourable Paul East, decided to make 
the decision personally.104 It was also deemed appropriate for the Attorney-General 
Michael Cullen to step in when he overruled a District Court judge's decision to issue an 
arrest warrant against a visiting former Israeli general the judge believed was answerable 
for Middle East war crimes.105 These situations are reliant on the Attorney-General’s 
judgement as to when it would be appropriate or not to intervene. There is no independent 
review of their interference. In terms of accountability in these circumstances, again, no 
forum exists to debate with the Attorney-General and allow him to justify his conduct. The 
House, pursuant to Standing Orders, may not comment on the duration of the 
prosecution.106 Interference is ad hoc and therefore we rely solely on convention as the 
restraint. 
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Nevertheless, in the Law Commission’s view, it is entirely proper for the Attorney-General 
to direct prosecution policies, “so long as that is done in the public interest and free from 
improper political influence”.107 But this paper is questioning what the consequences are 
for a failure to perform apolitically are. In order to be confident that politics are absent 
from the role, the alternative option is that the Attorney-General removes himself or herself 
from Cabinet. It is noted that David Lange sat outside Cabinet in his short time as Attorney-
General before Labour’s defeat in election in 1990.108 The argument is that the Attorney-
General should not be involved in questions of government policy or too closely in policy 
debates within government; he or she “should not engage in robust political debate except 
in relation to his own portfolio and should be generally reticent and non-confrontational 
with respect to party politics.”109 This notion, often described as “independent 
aloofness”,110 has largely been upheld in the United Kingdom where the Attorney-General 
has not been a member of Cabinet since 1928.111 By contrast, the Attorney-General of the 
United States is appointed by the President, is a member of Cabinet and therefore forms 
part of the executive government, much like New Zealand.  
 
The interaction between the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General can be helpfully 
demonstrated by the prosecution of John Banks. The situation arose where Banks was 
accused of filing a false electoral return. Although he was acquitted in the Court of Appeal, 
Banks sought an investigation when the Crown had withheld some information relating to 
the memorandum of Banks’ lawyer. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Crown’s 
submissions that the memorandum should not have been disclosed and Banks claimed “the 
Solicitor-General has a lot to answer for”.112 In July of this year, the Attorney-General 
confirmed he was satisfied with the way Crown Law conducted itself in the prosecution 
against Banks.113 It was, in his opinion, in line with the Prosecution Guidelines 2013.114 
Finlayson, as the Attorney-General, stated he would avoid any involvement in the criminal 
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proceedings but “he was responsible for ensuring the Crown Law office had a good 
reputation”.115 This example serves to show the defined relationship between the Solicitor-
General and the Attorney-General. Evidently, the Solicitor-General is accountable to the 
Attorney-General because he or she must answer to Parliament on the conduct of all 
litigation on behalf of the government.116 But that accountability is not necessarily 
applicable for vice versa, especially since the Solicitor-General is junior law officer. This 
will be addressed in the following section. 
 Accountability by the Solicitor-General and Crown Law 
In situations where the Attorney-General is misusing his power, the Solicitor-General may 
feel an obligation to step in. This must solely be a personal obligation or a sense of duty 
held by the Solicitor-General. The most prominent weakness of this is that the Solicitor-
General’s role is the junior legal officer and therefore inferior to the Attorney-General. If 
the Solicitor-General was required or felt obliged to keep the Attorney-General in check, 
this could in fact give birth to a conflict of interest between his employment and whistle 
blowing on the Attorney-General’s wrongful actions. There is currently no accountability 
framework appropriate for the Solicitor-General to occupy. 
 
Crown Law as an accountability forum is also not strong. Crown Law Office is a 
department of the public service with specialist responsibilities for providing legal advice 
and representation to the Government (in particular, departments and Ministers) in matters 
affecting the Crown.117 It is led by the Solicitor-General and therefore, indirectly, by the 
Attorney-General who oversees the Solicitor-General. Part of the Crown Law Office is the 
Attorney-General’s group. Therefore it is weak from a constitutional perspective, because 
it is under the Minister’s direction, it does not have inquisitorial powers and cannot issue 
sanctions against the Minister or government. It would be difficult to redefine the scope of 
the Office because its functions lie in legal advice to government. By restructuring it so it 
does operate independently, like a commission, it could require the Attorney-General to 
annually report on his or her actions of the previous year. In this way, the Attorney-General 
could reflect on their progress as well as receiving review, criticisms and compliments from 
the Solicitor-General and his team without fear of disfavour. This would be particularly 
beneficial in the rare situations that the Attorney-General involves themself in litigation 
involving the public interest. 
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 Media Accountability 
The media is “by far the most important” source of information about officials’ activities 
and decisions,118 thereby representing a necessary condition for the existence of democratic 
government and a pre-condition for accountability.119 The media can play a key role in 
enabling citizens, “who have imperfect information about government activities”, 120 to 
monitor the individual actions of ministers. This ultimately results in a government that is 
“more accountable and responsive to its citizens and rendering elected politicians more 
accountable.”121 
 
Bovens himself considers that the media can be a form of political accountability.122 From 
a democratic perspective, the media can be very effective, especially since the Attorney-
General has a high profile and often reports on or in relation to high profile cases. 
Newspaper articles add to the transparency of the role but there are no real inquisitorial 
powers available to journalists. To a small extent, challenging journalists can ask questions 
of the Attorney-General’s activity but the Attorney-General has no obligation to respond 
to the questions. However, failure to do so may result in a judgement by the newspaper, 
accusing the Attorney-General of doing a poor job. Therefore although the media cannot 
impose formal sanctions, its actions can indirectly result in political consequences for the 
Minister and government. 
 
One example of the Attorney-General’s interaction with the media was in relation to the 
Banks prosecution, as discussed earlier in this part. He was subsequently answerable to the 
media for Crown Law, stating he was “satisfied” it had been dealt with properly.123 
However, the position is in its very nature is a legal one. It is not necessarily appropriate 
for the media to deal with and ‘pose questions’ to the Attorney-General in regards to 
complex legal matters. Another main weakness of the media are the risks of sensationalised 
reporting, where journalists simply want to ‘frame’ the persecutor for dramatic effect; a 
situation is sensationalised in a scandalous light for commercial motivations. In regard to 
these issues and in my view, the Attorney-General has little accountability to the media. 
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An appropriate forum must have proper understanding of the law and be able to pose the 
right kind of questions in order for the Attorney-General to respond and justify.  
 Political Accountability 
As a Minister, the Attorney-General must answer to Parliament for the actions of himself, 
the Solicitor-General and the Crown Law Office, as well as for those other agencies under 
the Attorney’s ministerial control such as the Parliamentary Counsel Office.124 This is 
prescribed as individual ministerial responsibility in the Cabinet Manual.125 The Attorney-
General has overall responsibility for the conduct of all legal proceedings involving the 
Crown, and can be expected to keep his or her fellow ministers generally informed of the 
initiation, progress and outcome of such proceedings against or by the Government.126 On 
occasion, a Minister may be required to account for the actions of a department when errors 
are made, even when the Minister had no personal knowledge of, or involvement in, those 
actions.”127 In serious situations of departmental error, it is an expectation that that the 
Minister will resign. This has not occurred to date in the role of the Attorney-General. 
Moreover, in recent times, the convention has been less strictly followed where Ministers 
are not resigning and therefore the convention has somewhat flouted. 
 
Political accountability is also heavily circumscribed by the unwillingness of the Attorney-
General to engage in discussion regarding his portfolio. Essentially, “how effective 
parliamentary questioning is depends on the questioner and, I suppose, it depends on the 
willingness of the Minister to give information.”128 Quite recently, the Attorney-General 
chose not to inform the House about the Pike River Mine prosecution. In 2014, he refused 
to answer questions in Question Time in relation to the disaster by stating the responsibility 
falls solely on the Solicitor-General (see Appendix Two). Trevor Mallard questioned, “Mr 
Speaker. Can I invite you to go back and look at that answer, look at the Cabinet Manual, 
and look at the Standing Orders, and inform us who is answerable in Parliament for those 
[prosecution] decisions if it is not the Attorney-General?”129 The Speaker did not rule on 
the matters raised by Mallard in the House. It is, on one hand, difficult for the Attorney-
General to answer questions that he has no knowledge of. On the other hand, it is important 
for Crown Law to be questioned on their action in order to ensure the process is accountable 
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and progressing fairly. The Attorney-General could request the information in order to 
answer on it. The issue rests on the fact that parliamentary questions relating to legal advice 
may not be answered on the basis of privilege - unless the government (via the Attorney-
General) decides otherwise. Finally, the sub judice rule restricts debate in relation to cases 
proceeding through the courts and also severely limits the extent to which the work of the 
Law Officers are subject to scrutiny.130 
 
VI  Link between the Executive and the Judiciary 
 Introduction  
The Attorney-General is a member of both the Executive and a Member of Parliament that 
appoints the judiciary. In New Zealand there is a separation of powers between the 
legislature, executive and the judiciary. This separation ensures there are checks and 
balances within the system and that accountability and impartiality are maintained.131 This 
aligns with Bovens’ constitutional perspective; a fundamental principle of democracy. 
Each branch of government has a role in balancing and reviewing the power of the two 
other branches. For example, through the process of judicial review, the judiciary examines 
the actions of the Executive. Meanwhile, the Executive is principally involved in the 
selection of Judges. Both the Executive and Parliament would be involved in the dismissal 
of Judges in the event of misconduct.132 
 
Fundamental to the separation of powers is the independence of the judiciary. The public 
must be confident that their disputes will be resolved according to the law and without “fear 
or favour, affection or ill will”.133 Judges’ salaries must not to be reduced in their 
commission;134 judges are protected against removal from office.135 This ensures the 
judiciary are not improperly influenced by the executive or legislature branches. The 
Attorney-General has two important duties in maintenance of the rule of law and their 
independence. First, the Attorney-General protects the judiciary from criticism in the 
House. Secondly, he or she appoints and dismisses judges. It is a strong convention that in 
the judicial appointment process, the Attorney-General must act independently of politics 
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and therefore improper influence. This decision has been largely criticised with suggestions 
that a Judicial Appointments Unit be created. In my opinion, convention, consultation and 
transparency is enough to hold the Attorney-General to account. A failure to act properly, 
given the constitutional importance of judicial independence will result, in political 
consequences. 
 Protecting the Judiciary from Criticism 
The Attorney-General also has a particular responsibility as a Minister for protecting the 
judiciary from improper and unfair public criticism, for example, by addressing attacks on 
their decisions and by discouraging other Ministers from engaging in improper attacks or 
criticism.136 This is a strong convention. It is also upheld in the Standing Orders which 
state “a member may not use offensive words against the House or against any member of 
the judiciary.”137 Criticising judges is discouraged in order to maintain judicial 
independence, as discussed earlier.  
 
Whether the Attorney-General is the right person to carry out this role of protection from 
political criticism has been a fierce debate in Australia. On one hand, it is not the Attorney-
General’s role to defend the judiciary and the judiciary should not presume that the political 
office of Attorney-General can or should represent judicial interests.138 On the other hand, 
it ensures that political attacks are responded to by a prominent, influential figure in the 
political arena and ensures that judges are not forced into that arena themselves.139 On 
occasion, when political and media criticism of the courts or a court decision reaches a 
point where it threatens to undermine public confidence in the courts, it is at that point the 
Attorney-General should assert himself to protect the courts from irresponsible criticism.140 
In terms of accountability, this is important from a constitutional perspective. By linking 
the Attorney-General with the judiciary, it ensures there is not overbearing and intrusive 
legislature let into the judicial arena. Bovens reminds us that “good governance arises from 
a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers of the state” and this is achieved by the 
Attorney-General also standing up for the judiciary in situations of criticism. Ultimately, 
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the Attorney-General is in a unique position as both “a bridge and a gatekeeper” between 
the Executive, Parliament and the Judiciary.141 
 Judicial Appointment 
In terms of the appointment of judges, new procedures were introduced in 1999, which 
made the Attorney-General responsible for the process. In Judicial Protocol it states that 
“making recommendations to the Governor-General for the appointment of Judges is a 
most important responsibility in a democracy such as New Zealand, operating under the 
rule of law.” Some of the guiding principles for the procedures and processes have been 
formalised to:142 
 
Clear and publicly identified processes for selection and appointment; 
Clear and publicly identified criteria against which persons considered are assessed;  
Clear and publicly identified opportunities for expressing an interest in appointment; 
A commitment to actively promoting diversity in the judiciary without compromising 
the principle of merit selection. 
 
Appointments are made on the basis of merit.143 The criteria for appointment include legal 
ability, qualities of character, personal and technical skills and reflection of society.144 The 
Attorney-General’s Judicial Appointments Unit was set up to specifically handle 
expressions of interest in judicial appointments with the highest degree of confidentiality 
and security. The Appointments Unit is attached to the Ministry of Justice, but its records 
are held separately from those of the Ministry.145 Judicial appointments are made by the 
Governor-General on the recommendation of the Attorney-General. By convention, the 
Attorney-General receives advice from the Chief Justice and the Solicitor-General for 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court appointments.146 District Court 
appointments involve advice from the Chief District Court Judge and the Secretary for 
Justice.147 See Appendix One for the specific process from consultations to appointment.  
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Although appointments are made by the Executive, it is a strong constitutional convention 
that the Attorney-General acts independently of party political considerations. It is 
imperative that appointments are made “in his or her capacity as First Law Officer of the 
Crown, rather than as cabinet minister dispatching government business.”148 Convention 
means the Attorney-General mentions appointments at Cabinet after they have been 
determined, thereby ensuring that they are not subject to Cabinet discussion. The strength 
of conventions and subsequent political accountability are discussed next. 
 
In terms of dismissal, the Attorney-General’s office is also concerned with initiating the 
removal of judges.149 If the Judicial Conduct Panel concludes that the removal of a judge 
is justified, the Attorney-General retains absolute discretion as to whether to initiate the 
removal of the judge.150 If the Attorney-General agrees that a superior court judge should 
be removed from the bench then they must address Parliament to propose that it 
recommend to the Governor-General that the judge be removed.151 If Parliament makes 
that recommendation then the Governor-General will dismiss the judge.152 For judges from 
the lower courts, the Attorney-General advises the Governor-General who can then 
formally remove the judge from office.153 Responsibility for both appointment and 
dismissal enhances the need for accountability. 
1 Conventions 
Conventions hold that the Attorney-General has widespread consultation powers and that 
appointments are made based on merit. Finlayson confirms that he “consults widely on 
judicial appointments and, as a matter of course, this involves discussions with the New 
Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Bar Association, as well as the Chief Justice 
and other heads of bench about the suitability of candidates.”154 Justice McGrath contends 
that the strength of this convention is often under-estimated and that holders of offices 
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governed by conventional duties have a strong sense of obligation not to fail in those 
responsibilities.155 Previous Solicitor-General Terrence Arnold expressed similar opinions, 
stating “these conventions are robust, essentially as a result of the scrupulous way in which 
they have been understood and observed by the relevant actors over many years.”156 Thus 
although an Attorney-General could conceivably breach convention by making judicial 
appointments based on political motives,157 it is important to keep in mind that “this can 
be said of many of our offices that are restrained by constitutional conventions”.158  
 
The operation and strength of some conventions can be verified by the public.159 But while 
some may question an appointment, whether the appointment was actually based on 
improper influences and political factors can only be determined by the Attorney-General 
himself. This means that “the public must rely on the integrity and assurances of ‘insiders’ 
to know whether the convention is strong. Unsurprisingly, this provides a lesser sense of 
certainty about the reliability of the process.”160 In Canada they have a very similar 
appointments process whereby judicial appointment is largely governed by convention. 
Peter McCormick summarised the problem as:161  
 
It may well be that the right people are involved, that they are making their decisions 
on defensible criteria, and that their advice is strictly followed by the politicians, with 
purely professional considerations always being preemptive – but since we do not 
know that this is the case, we have to take it on faith, and this phrase is the very 
antithesis of transparency.  
 
The fact that Law Officers have confirmed appointments occur independently of political 
considerations increases public confidence in the selection process. However, doubts are 
always likely to arise in any system that gives wide discretion to a government minister. 
This is especially so in a society who is increasingly willing to question authority figures 
and demand greater transparency.162 There will always be perceptions of bias, regardless 
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of how impartial appointments are on paper and in practice, simply because of the fact that 
appointments are made by a government minister without any public oversight.163 In terms 
of Bovens accountability this means that the democratic perspective is failing.  
2 Political accountability 
Two previous Attorneys-General in New Zealand state that ultimately the decision to 
appoint judges should rest with the Executive because they are then politically accountable 
for the choices they make in this area.164 This indicates that failure to act apolitically would 
come under scrutiny in the House of Representatives. Although comments and criticisms 
on the judiciary are generally not allowed in Parliament, they are sometimes heard. It is 
difficult to suspect whether an appointment was made, or a candidate was rejected, on 
inappropriate grounds. Diversion from the Judicial Protocol may give some indication and 
therefore allow political opposition to mobilise. Former Chief Justice Sir Thomas 
Eichelbaum reminds us that “what remain unknown and unseen are the cases where for 
politically influenced reasons, particular persons are not appointed”.165 Thus the protection 
afforded by political accountability is fairly weak given that appointments are announced 
only after they have been decided. 
 
In a situation where the Attorney-General appointed his or her ‘buddy’ as a judge, there 
are no accountability mechanisms in place. In my opinion, it would be appropriate in 
Parliament to scrutinise the actions of the Attorney-General and question the process. If 
this were to happen, it is likely that a Judicial Appointments Commission would be formed.   
3 A Judicial Appointments Commission 
For fear of political manipulation, academics have suggested that there should be an 
independent Judicial Appointments Commission. Since April 2006, judicial appointments 
in the United Kingdom came under the responsibility of an independent Judicial 
Appointments Commission. Previously, appointments were made on the recommendation 
of the Lord Chancellor, who, like the Attorney-General, was a government minister and 
member of cabinet. This process was strongly criticised for allowing a member of the 
government to have the sole responsibility for appointing judges. The creation of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission therefore strives “to maintain and strengthen judicial 
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independence by taking responsibility for selecting candidates for judicial office out of the 
hands of the Lord Chancellor and making the appointments process clearer and more 
accountable”.166 In terms of accountability, a Judicial Appointments Commission would 
improve the appointment process because it would promote wider consultation, remove 
mystique surrounding the appointments process and avoid risk of political influence. The 
Commission subsequently recommends candidates to the Lord Chancellor, or to the 
Attorney-General in New Zealand’s situation, who has a very limited power of veto. 
 
New Zealand has resisted calls for a Judicial Appointments Commission. Opponents 
question the need for an independent commission and point to the risk of political 
appointments to the commission itself and therefore compromising its independence. No 
questions have been raised about the independence and professionalism of judges 
appointed under the present system.167 I therefore conclude there is no pressing need for a 
commission to be created. The system is relatively transparent through its online reporting, 
with clear guidelines as to process and consultation, which is ensured by convention. It is 
important, however, to improve accountability in the situation of poor decision-making on 
the Attorney-General’s behalf. It may be appropriate in these circumstances that the 
Standing Orders are relaxed and therefore allow Parliament to question the Attorney-
General’s process.  
 
VII Mechanisms outside Formal Accountability 
  Introduction 
Accountability and transparency are essential to the functioning of our open government. 
New Zealand ranks consistently highly by international standards for an open 
government.168 In 2014, the World Justice Project ranked the country number two in the 
world for “Open Government”.169 However, the increasing expectation of accountability 
and transparency from the public sector must be appropriately balanced with allowing and 
supporting the ability of the government to govern effectively and efficiently as they are 
elected to do.170 Accountability overloads are circumstances in which, “the relevant actor 
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is so occupied giving account within various, possibly competing accountability 
frameworks, that he or she has no time to do his or her job”.171 As analysed above, the 
Courts, Parliament, Crown Law and Solicitor-General are not appropriate accountability 
forums by Bovens definition. However, this does not mean the role is free for the actor to 
use power as he or she wishes. In some respects, transparency and culture are equally 
important. In the next part, I discuss the culture that surrounds the Attorney-General. First, 
it is necessary that the actor is a lawyer. A legal education is important for the legal advisor 
role and introduces another accountability forum that is the New Zealand Law Society. 
Secondly, the actor’s own sense of duty makes the selection process a crucial one.  
 Lawyer Requirement 
Currently there is no legal requirement concerning the qualifications of the Attorney-
General. However, it has been tradition in New Zealand to appoint a lawyer.172 This adds 
to the control of the role. 
 
There have been two administrations in which the Attorney-General has not been a lawyer. 
Firstly, on the resignation of Downie Stewart, the Prime Minister at the time, also became 
Attorney-General in 1933, because, it seems, he was of the view there was no lawyer 
suitable for the office in the ranks of the parliamentary party supporting the government. 
While there is no constitutional impediment, there would be concern among the legal 
profession if the holder were not qualified as a lawyer. That is because the Attorney-
General’s responsibilities are essentially those of the senior legal adviser and legal 
decision-maker within government.173 
 
Secondly, in 2005, Honourable Michael Cullen, namely Deputy Prime Minister and Leader 
of the House, was appointed the Attorney-General under Helen Clark’s Labour government 
until the General Election in September 2005.174 It stirred much controversy among the 
legal profession to the point that the New Zealand Law Society passed a resolution 
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deprecating the appointment.175 Controversy was muted, perhaps, by the power of the 
office and the obvious competence of its holder. Cullen was subsequently reappointed as 
Attorney-General in March 2006 on the resignation of the Honourable David Parker.176 In 
a speech to the Legal Research Foundation, Cullen justified his lack of legal qualifications. 
Cullen said that “the Attorney-General is the senior law officer of the Crown but, apart 
from a ten-year experiment with a non-political Attorney-General (James Prendergast from 
1865-1875, later Chief Justice) the Attorney-General is also a politician and Minister and 
is not necessarily a lawyer.”177  He claimed that he “cannot accept that admission to the 
Bar confers some kind of sacred knowledge that cannot be acquired any other way”.178 
That may be so, but Cullen still required a Parliamentary Private Secretary for assistance, 
Russell Fairbrother, who was a registered lawyer.  
 
Opposing this view, one academic noted that the skills required for Attorney-Generalship 
cannot be acquired in any other way other than through a legal education.179 The Attorney-
General’s role is the principal legal adviser for the government and, therefore, is 
responsible for ensuring that the government conducts itself in accordance with the law.180 
The Attorney-General may appear personally in cases of exceptional gravity or great public 
importance either nationally or internationally.181 Moreover, the Attorney-General 
provides legal advice to Cabinet – a function involving the practice of law. The Attorney-
General’s role is also to encourage ministers to seek legal advice in the course of 
government decision-making. A lawyer is able to identify issues of potential legal 
controversy where legal advice is important. If Cabinet issues are delayed due to delayed 
legal insight, “then the machinery of government may become very inefficient”.182  
 
The Attorney-General is considered leader of the legal profession, especially given its 
titular significance. The decision of Helen Clark to appoint Cullen may have been a result 
of a lack of other lawyers in Cabinet at the time of his appointment. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that future Prime Ministers “recognise these raw realities and, in their wisdom, 
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desist from such controversial appointments”.183 Richard Worth, National Party 
spokesman on justice at the time, added that “if New Zealand is to pursue a lonely course 
with the appointment of an Attorney-General without legal skills, then the tasks associated 
with the office will be compromised.”184 Therefore in my opinion, it is necessary for the 
position to be occupied by a lawyer and thereby maintain a good relationship with the 
administrators of the law: the judiciary. A strong legal background also provides the 
possibility of added control through the New Zealand Law Society. This will be dealt with 
next. 
 New Zealand Law Society 
If convention holds that the Attorney-General be a lawyer, then he or she is subject to the 
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and the regulations and rules made under that 
Act.185 The regulatory functions of the Law Society include controlling and regulating 
the practice of the profession of law in New Zealand, and assisting and promoting the 
reform of the law (for the purpose of upholding the rule of law and the administration 
of justice).186 The Law Society issues annual practicing certificates for lawyers to be 
able to provide legal services. This means that the Attorney-General is also subject to 
the rules of Client Conduct and Care and failure to do so will result in scrutiny by the 
Law Society. This is one means of accountability: a learning perspective as described 
by Bovens to ensure that any major departures from accepted practice are managed 
accordingly.  
 
The New Zealand Law Society supports that the Attorney-General (in practice with the 
Solicitor-General/Crown Law) should assume the role of central authority in relation to 
extradition on criminal processes.187 “Such decisions can be left to an official such as the 
Solicitor-General to certify that processes have been properly followed.” 188 The Law 
Society believes that the Solicitor-General may ensure that the Attorney-General’s job is 
done properly; as previously discussed, however, in my opinion the Solicitor-General is 
not in a position to do this. Overall, the Law Society does not act as a proper check on the 
actions of the Attorney-General. Failure to abide by the rules and regulations as a lawyer, 
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may mean that the Attorney-General, if serious enough, could have his practising certificate 
removed. At the end of the day, the Law Society are not in a particularly strong position to 
regularly pose questions about each of the roles the Attorney-General occupies or make a 
judgement with sanctions. The accountability does not meet the standard held by Bovens. 
In saying that it helps to guide and contribute to the overall control of the role. 
 A Sense of Duty 
The Prime Minister determines portfolio allocations and ministerial rankings, taking into 
account practical and political considerations.189 The Attorney-General, therefore is 
appointed, on merit, by the Prime Minister. The way the Attorney-General interprets their 
role is really a matter of their personal understanding of the role. Some, like David Lange, 
thought the Attorney-General should be outside Cabinet to try and de-politicise it.190 Being 
in Cabinet, however, has the advantage of the Attorney-General having a better 
understanding of the potential issues that may raise rule of law issues. It means that section 
7 reports enabled the Attorney-General to interact with other Ministries to make their 
policies New Zealand Bill of Rights compliant.  In essence, the role is full of ambiguity 
and therefore depends on the personal integrity of who holds the office.  
 
Selection process may therefore be the best form of control – a rigorous process that ensures 
the best candidate for the job is appointed and will uphold the democratic values of New 
Zealand’s constitution. However, no information is publicly available regarding the 
selection process for the Attorney-General. It is predicted that an individual with a legal 
background and litigation experience will be selected, based on that merit. For example, 
Finlayson, prior to entering Parliament in 2005, practised law in Wellington for over 25 
years.191 He had nine appearances in the Privy Council and is a member of the Rules 
Committee of the High Court which regulates court procedures in New Zealand. Finlayson 
was appointed to the role of Attorney-General in 2008 along with other separate ministerial 
portfolios. After the 2011 and 2014 elections, Chris was reappointed Attorney-General.192 
 
Matthew Palmer speaks of a constitutional culture where actors can frame their roles as 
they see fit.193 They do this by either looking to past traditions, using conventions as 
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guidance or using their own sense of rightness to make the best actions in the role. It is 
through the appointment process that an actor with a sense of duty will be appointed and 
this is the controlling factor of the role. Bovens’ learning perspective is applicable here 
because Attorneys-General can look to previous actors and search for improvements and 
successes in the role. Bovens articulates that the “public nature of the accountability 
process teaches others in similar positions what is expected of them, what works and what 
does not.”194 Conventions are inherently a source of scepticism because they lack any legal 
enforcement. But it must be reminded that:195 
 
Within the conventions of Parliament the Attorney-General is accepted as having an 
individual, independent judicial responsibility to act in a judicial way, and to report on 
matters even when there may be political pressures not to notice that particular matter. 
Most of the people who have been appointed in the past to the position of Attorney-
General are of such a calibre that they would rather resign than fail to carry out their 
legislative responsibilities in a particular way. 
 
VIII Options for Reform 
 Cabinet Membership 
New Zealand supports the Attorney-General sitting in Cabinet in order for the public 
interest to be properly ascertained. The public interest “cannot be determined in isolation 
from practical realities, and that may require that political factors be considered along with 
others”.196 However, if there is growing concern around the Attorney-General’s extensive 
power with no accountability, one alternative is for the Attorney-General to sit outside of 
Cabinet and adopt the English model.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the Attorney-General is a Minister, directs prosecutions (in 
conjunction with the Director of Public Prosecutions) but does not regularly attend 
meetings of Cabinet.197 In 1924, under Ramsay Macdonald’s government, the then 
Attorney-General was Sir Patrick Hastings who allegedly dropped a sensitive prosecution 
as a result of political pressure from the Prime Minister.198 The truth of the accusation 
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remains a matter of debate; Hastings vowed throughout that he made the decision without 
interference. In any event, the episode precipitated the downfall of the Macdonald 
government and appears to have established as a constitutional rule the office’s 
independent status.199 Subsequently, since 1928, the British Attorney-General has not been 
a member of Cabinet.200  
 
The Constitutional Affairs Committee has recommended that the Attorney-General should 
attend Cabinet by invitation, and then only for the consideration of specific and relevant 
agenda items. The arrangements for the Attorney-General to attend Cabinet should be clear 
and specific to giving legal advice. This is because it is important to make clear, when the 
Attorney-General is giving advice to Cabinet, that he is not part of that group but is a person 
advising that group.201 By not being part of that group, the advice can be said to be 
objective.202 The danger of the Attorney-General participating generally in Cabinet policy-
making is that it blurs the distinction which should be clearly maintained between the 
function of legal adviser and a member of the ministerial and political leadership.203 
Separating the political functions of the Attorney-General from the legal functions is best 
achieved through transparency. 
 
My view on membership of Cabinet in New Zealand is that it is appropriate for the 
Attorney-General to sit in Cabinet. Although a number of the advisory roles must be 
discharged free of partisan factors, political considerations in the wider sense can never be 
ignored. Concerns of political involvement can be resolved through more robust 
accountability mechanisms.  
 A Select Committee and Codification 
It has been also suggested in England that a parliamentary select committee be established 
to specifically scrutinise the Attorney-General.204 At present, however, there is no such 
committee. Lord Goldsmith sees value in such scrutiny by a suitably well-informed select 
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committee.205 There would need to be some limitations, for example in relation to current 
criminal cases and national security issues. In Lord Goldsmith’s opinion, such an 
arrangement could significantly enhance accountability for, and understanding of, the 
Attorney-General’s role.206 The British Attorney-General suggests two possible ways of 
clarifying the Attorney-General’s role. One is the imposition of a statutory duty 
(comparable to that imposed on the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act) to 
promote the Rule of Law.207 This might be coupled with further provisions as to the 
qualifications for appointment as a Law Officer and the nature of the role. 208 These 
proposals would simply codify the role in a way which might give greater clarity and 
transparency. 
 
As surfaced in the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill of United Kingdom analysis, “the 
accountability of the Attorney-General remains limited”.209 The Bill proposed that the 
Attorney-General improve on current annual reports as well as making reports on situations 
where the decision made was not to prosecute. The reform Bill stated that “the Attorney-
General must lay before Parliament a Report on the exercise of his or her functions during 
the previous year”.210  Mandated transparency would, at least, contribute to more 
transparency and responsiveness from the role. However, issues remained unsolved; critics 
argue that it is “unlikely to create greater accountability, given the limits on the information 
which they will contain”.211  
 
IX Conclusion  
 
The Attorney-General holds strong legal and political influence in New Zealand’s 
constitutional arrangements. The role’s influence on lawyers, politicians, Crown Law, 
Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Governor-General stimulated my accountability 
evaluation. This paper has aimed to analyse the relative strength of accountability forums 
for the Attorney-General in relation to each of the actor’s roles. First, the Attorney-General 
is the senior law officer. In this capacity he or she provides legal advice which is protected 
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by legal professional privilege. The Attorney-General also advises the Governor-General 
on the Royal assent and is required to report to the House on bills inconsistent with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights. For the latter, there is no legal accountability in place as 
decided in Boscawen v Attorney-General. It is suggested in this paper that judicial review 
could be introduced in relation to this report. There was some mention by the courts that if 
the Attorney-General were to cause atrocity, consequences would result. Ultimately, it is a 
political function and therefore must be accounted for politically in the House of 
Representatives. The Courts, a standing Committee and a supreme Bill of Rights were 
presented as alternatives to section 7 reporters.  
 
Delegating the role of legal proceedings to the Solicitor-General was discussed next. This 
responsibility is predominantly controlled by convention. Possible accountability forums 
included the Solicitor-General and Crown Law Office, the media and Parliament. Through 
my analysis I concluded that the relative forums did not adequately meet Bovens’ 
definition. Most problematically was that they lacked the ability to make a judgement and 
provide consequences.  
 
The Attorney-General is the link between the executive and the judiciary. The actor is 
responsible for appointing and dismissing judges and for protecting them from criticism. 
This role is particularly important in terms of being accountable in order to ensure the rule 
of law is maintained. Conventions, political accountability and a judicial appointment 
commission were discussed in relation to this.  
 
It is suggested that the need for control of the role is just as important as accountability. 
This does not necessarily need to be achieved through forums that scrutinise, judge and 
provide consequences for the Attorney-General, but shape the role so that its power is not 
abused. Mechanisms outside of formal accountability include requiring the actor to be a 
lawyer, with subsequent responsibilities to the Law Society, and their own sense of duty. 
For the latter, this means that the Attorney-General selection process is crucial to adequate 
performance of the duties. 
 
Finally, this paper provided a comparative analysis, predominantly with the United 
Kingdom. Their Attorney-General sits outside of Cabinet in order to remove politics from 
the legal process. Though it has its merits, in my opinion, it is best that New Zealand’s 
Attorney-General remains in Cabinet in order to be informed with our current political 
situation and to fully engage in questioning in the House. There are merits for a select 
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committee to scrutinise the actions of the Attorney-General in order to improve regular 
reporting and therefore enhance transparency. 
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X Appendix One: Judicial Appointment Process 
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XI Appendix Two: Pike River Mine (Question Time 5 March 2014) 
 
ANDREW LITTLE (Labour) to the Attorney-General: Will he release all 
correspondence between the Christchurch Crown Solicitor or any other solicitor acting for 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, and counsel for Peter Whittall on 
the decision not to proceed with the prosecution of Mr Whittall under the Health and Safety 
in Employment Act 1992 relating to conditions at the Pike River Mine that lead to the 
deaths of 29 miners; if not, why not? 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON (Attorney-General): No, because that is not a 
decision for me to make. 
Andrew Little: In light of that answer and in light of the public statement made by counsel 
for Peter Whittall on Friday, 28 February at 4.23 p.m. that “Neither Mr Whittall nor Mr 
Grieve have any issue with any of their letters on this matter being made public.”, and 
thereby waiving their legal professional privilege, why will he not now ensure that that 
correspondence is released? 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: The member did not listen, or did not listen 
carefully, to my answer to his first question. That is not a decision for me to make. Perhaps 
I can help the honourable member by referring him to the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution 
Guidelines and the introduction to it by me, which says “Under our constitutional 
arrangements, the Attorney-General is responsible through Parliament”— 
Grant Robertson: This is humble. 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Well, instead of making unpleasant comments, Mr 
Robertson should listen, because, I am sure Mr Little would agree, this is a very serious 
matter. 
Mr SPEAKER: Order! If the Minister could just give his answer, it would be helpful. 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: I will go back for a minute, because Mr Little at 
least is taking this seriously. Under our constitutional arrangements, the Attorney-General 
is responsible through Parliament to the citizens of New Zealand for prosecutions carried 
out by or on behalf of the Crown. In practice, however, the prosecution process is 
superintended by the Solicitor-General who, pursuant to section 9A of the Constitution Act 
1986, shares all the relevant powers vested in the Office of the Attorney-General. 
Andrew Little: What information about the state or progress of the prosecution did 
Cabinet have before it when deciding not to take action to ask the shareholders in Pike 
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River, including Crown entities, to make good the reparation orders made by the District 
Court on 5 July 2013? 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Regrettably, the member did not listen to the first 
answer to the question. Cabinet did not make a decision, and the implication in his question 
is deeply constitutionally offensive. These are decisions that are made by the Solicitor-
General. Cabinet has no place in deciding on the initiation, the continuance, or the bringing 
to an end of a prosecution. 
Andrew Little: Was the offer on behalf of Mr Whittall, to pay $3.41 million to the families 
of the dead miners, taken into account in the decision not to proceed with the prosecution 
and in the subsequent decision to offer no evidence and seek a discharge, the equivalent of 
an acquittal? 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: As I said, these are matters for the Solicitor-
General. To the best of my knowledge, when the Solicitor-General and, through him, the 
Crown prosecutor in Christchurch were determining the matter, that was a factor that was 
taken into account. But there were a number of matters that meant that the Crown decided 
not to proceed with the prosecution. 
Andrew Little: How was the public interest test, required under paragraph 5.1.2 of the 
Solicitor-General’s prosecution guidelines of 1 July 2013, met in this case, in light of the 
clear findings of the royal commission of inquiry of the level of negligence by the mine 
owner’s officers, leading up to the fatal explosion on 19 November 2010 and the fact that 
29 men died at work in one fell swoop, causing widespread public alarm? 
Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Once again, I have to bring the member back to 
the prosecution guidelines and to the person who makes the decision, and the factors that 
are taken into account in making the decision. These matters are free from political 
interference, or at least in a National Government they are. 
Hon Trevor Mallard: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. Can I invite you to go back 
and look at that answer, look at the Cabinet Manual, and look at the Standing Orders, and 
inform us who is answerable in Parliament for those decisions if it is not the Attorney-
General. 
Mr SPEAKER: I will accept the invitation from the member, and I will certainly have 
another look at it. 
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